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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
ACORD v. HEDRICK, 342 S.E.2d 120 (W. Va. 1986).
Criminal Procedure-Evidence-Ineffective Assistance of Counsel-Private
Prosecutor
The defendant was convicted of first-degree sexual assault. This case was
the appointed defense attorney's first criminal case, although his cocounsel had
been a judge for 16 years. The victim's family hired an attorney to prosecute
the case. The defendant claimed that the private prosecutor "overmatched" his
court-appointed counsel, resulting in several reversible errors and depriving the
defendant of effective assistance of counsel.
To buttress his claim, the defendant asserted that the prosecution improperly
questioned witnesses.about items stolen on the night of the assault. The pros-
ecution also questioned the defendant's accomplices, and one of them testified
that he had pled guilty to grand larceny as a result of the events of the night
the alleged assault occurred. The jury was given an instruction limiting its con-
sideration of the guilty plea.
The defendant also claimed that he told the arresting officer that he did
not know anything about a crime being committed. The prosecution offered
testimony by the officer that the defendant "had nothing to say about the mat-
ter." The court instructed the jury that the testimony was not to be considered
as an incriminating statement but was to be considered only for impeaching the
defendant's prior testimony. The defendant petitioned the court for a writ of
habeas corpus.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals addressed the following issues:
(1) Whether the retention of a private prosecutor is per se improper; (2) whether
the testimony concerning the stolen items was admissible; (3) whether the court
erred in admitting the accomplice's guilty plea; (4) whether the officer's testi-
mony concerning the defendant's post-arrest silence was admissible; (5) whether
the defendant was deprived of due process by prosecutorial "overmatch" or
ineffective assistance of counsel.
The court held: (1) The retention of a private prosecutor is perfectly just,
legal, and fair in many cases, and is consistent with West Virginia Code section
7-7-8; (2) the testimony concerning the stolen items was admissible to establish
the identity of the person charged with the crime, which is one of the exceptions
under the collateral crime rule; (3) the accomplice's guilty plea was admitted
to show his credibility, and the court committed no error since it gave the jury
the proper limiting instruction; (4) the officer's testimony concerning the defend-
ant's post-arrest silence was admissible to impeach the defendant's prior state-
ment; (5) the defendant made no showing of actual prejudice that would support
a claim of prosecutorial "overmatch" or ineffective assistance of counsel. A
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mere imbalance between defense counsel and prosecution does not invalidate a
criminal trial.
FEATHERS v. DETRICK, 336 S.E.2d 922 (W. Va. 1985).
Criminal Procedure, Extradition-Parole Violation-Probable Cause
The appellant was convicted in Indiana of criminal offenses. After being
released from prison on parole, he violated the terms of his parole and came
to West Virginia. Although no judicial determination had been made regarding
whether appellant had violated the terms of his parole, he was scheduled to be
extradited from West Virginia to Indiana. The court authorized the extradition,
and the appellant appealed.
On appeal, the court addressed the issue of whether such an extradition was
proper. The supreme court held that the Uniform Extradition Act does not
require, as a prerequisite to the extradition of an alleged parole violator, a
judicial determination by the demanding state of probable cause to believe that
the person demanded has broken the terms of his or her parole. Therefore, the
extradition was proper.
FOX v. STATE, 347 S.E.2d 197 (W. Va. 1986).
Criminal Procedure-Habeas Corpus-Probation-Restitution
After pleading guilty to two counts of breaking and entering, petitioner was
placed on probation on the condition that he pay restitution. This condition of
restitution was included without an inquiry into the offender's ability to pay.
When the petitioner subsequently violated the terms of his probation by failing
to pay restitution, his probation was revoked, and he was sentenced to im-
prisonment at the state penitentiary. A writ of habeas corpus was then filed.
The court considered whether a condition of probation requiring an offender
to pay restitution is valid where the trial court makes no inquiry into the of-
fender's ability to pay such restitution without undue hardship on the offender
or his family.
The court determined that an inquiry into an offender's ability to pay is
statutorily required before the court may condition probation on reimbursement
of the costs of services rendered a defendant under the public defender law. In
addition, the sentencing court must conduct a hearing and make a finding on
the record with respect to the ability of the offender to pay restitution. Since
the trial court had no authority to include the restitution as a condition of the
petitioner's original probation, his violation of that condition cannot void the
probation sentence.
Justice Neely dissented to the requirement that the trial court make an in-
quiry into the offender's ability to pay restitution prior to including restitution
as a condition of probation.
1987]
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GOOD v. HANDLAN, 342 S.E.2d 111 (W. Va. 1986).
Criminal Procedure-Prohibition-Right o Speedy Trial-Three-term Rule
Relator was indicted in the January 1984 term and charged with second
degree murder. She moved for continuances in the January and May 1984 terms.
The relator requested a prompt trial in the September 1984 term, but the State
requested that she undergo a mental examination. In the May 1985 term, a joint
motion of the parties was granted, and allowed the matter to be continued
generally. In the September 1985 term, it was discovered that the presentence
reports had not been properly delivered. The relator then sought to prohibit
the court from trying her case because of the delay in bringing her case to trial.
The court considered the following issues: (1) Whether a defendant's right
to a speedy trial is violated when continuances, granted with good cause, have
delayed trial beyond three terms of court; and (2) whether the trial court's
ordering of a second mental examination of the relator was sufficient good cause
to avoid the provisions of the three-term rule.
The court decided that relator's right to a speedy trial is not violated when
her case is continued for good cause over several terms of court, and a con-
tinuance granted in order to conduct a second mental examination constituted
sufficient good cause.
HASAN v. HOLLAND, 342 S.E.2d 144 (W. Va. 1986).
Criminal Procedure
This was a proceding in habeas corpus by the petitioner, an inmate of the
West Virginia State Penitentiary at Moundsville. The petitioner contended that
the application of West Virginia Code section 28-5-27, t.he current "good time"
statute, to inmates such as himself, who were convicted of crimes committed
prior to the effective date of the statute, violated the constitutional prohibitions
against ex post facto laws. Petitioner had been convicted of two counts of break-
ing and entering and was sentenced. At this time inmates were eligible for "good
time," West Virginia Code section 28-5-28 (1977), in addition to "warden's good
time," West Virginia Code section 28-5-27a (1951), and "good time" for over-
time work, West Virginia Code section 28-5-27b, West Virginia Code section
28-5-27 (Supp. 1985) which was enacted in 1984, expressly repeals all former
"good time" provisions, makes "good time" available to all inmates, and is
applicable retroactively to those crimes committed prior to its effective date.
The writ of habeas corpus was discharged.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals addressed whether enactment
of the 1984 "good time" statute was disadvantageous to petitioner, and there-
fore violated ex post facto laws when it was applied retroactively to petitioner.
The court held that the new "good time" provisions, West Virignia Code
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was not violative of ex post facto laws. The petitioner was entitled to more
"good time" under the new statute than could have been earned under the prior
statute.
KENNEDY v. STATE, 342 S.E.2d 251 (W. Va. 1986).
Criminal Procedure-Prohibition
A criminal indictment charged the petitioner with two counts of obtaining
money by false pretenses. Petitioner claimed that the indictment, arising out of
contract negotiations, represented an abuse of the criminal process as it essen-
tially involved a contractual question rather than a criminal one. Petitioner also
claimed that the indictment itself was legally insufficient and that his right of
access to the complainant had been violated. Respondent Judge Narick denied
motions to dismiss. The petitioner then sought relief by petition for writ of
prohibition.
The court considered the following issues: (1) Whether a case arising from
contractual negotiations and alleging felonious intent constitutes substantial er-
ror if it is resolved through the criminal process; (2) whether an indictment is
insufficient when it alleges that an actual fraud has knowingly and falsely been
committed; (3) whether complainant and her private counsel interfered with
petitioner's constitutional rights of confrontation and assistance of counsel by
preventing the petitioner from interviewing the complainant about the criminal
action.
The court held that there is no substantial legal error committed by allowing
a case arising from contract negotiations to be adjudicated through the criminal
process. An indictment itself is not insufficient provided it follows the language
of the statute, fully informs the accused of the offense with which he is charged,
and enables the court to determine the statute on which the charge is based.
Finally, petitioner's constitutional rights were not interfered with by complain-
ant's actions. While a prosecutor may not instruct a witness to refuse to speak
with the defense, a witness may not be forced to do so, absent extraordinary
and compelling circumstances.
In re MENDEZ, 344 S.E.2d 396 (W. Va. 1985).
Canon 3, West Virginia Judicial Code of Ethics-Criminal Law-Criminal
Procedure
The Judicial Hearing Board in July 1985, found Mendez, a Magistrate in
Logan County, in violation of Canon 3A (1) and Canon 3A (4) of the Judicial
Code of Ethics for suspending the sentence of a convicted offender whom he
had sentenced to a jail term, and for engaging in ex parte communications with
the offender's father concerning the proceeding. The Board recommended that
Mendez be publicly censured.
1987]
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The issues addressed by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals were:
(1) Whether a magistrate in West Virignia has the power to suspefid a sentence
imposed in a criminal case; and (2) whether Mendez's efforts to contact the
Logan County circuit judges and the prosecuting attorney, and his reliance upon
the statement of an assistant prosecuting attorney who told him he could find
no law that would preclude Mendez from suspending the Craddock sentence
should weigh as mitigating factors to his actions.
In affirming the Judicial Hearing Board's ruling, the court held that a mag-
istrate in West Virginia has no power to suspend a sentence imposed in a criminal
case, and Mendez thus committed a legal error in suspending the sentence of
Mark Craddock. Even if Mendez had had such authority, he acted in this case
upon the unverified, ex parte representation of Craddock's father that the jail
sentence was harmful to Mark Craddock's medical ailment. Since the ailment
was not disclosed to Mendez at the time of sentencing, and in view of the fact
that Mark Craddock was serving his sentence upon weekends only, the Judicial
Hearing Board was correct in finding that "no urgency existed" to suspend the
sentence. Mendez's efforts to contact officials for authorization were com-
mendable and showed the absence of improper motive; however, Mendez's ac-
tions were sufficiently egregious to warrant public censure.
PRATT v. HOLLAND, 338 S.E.2d 236 (W. Va. 1985).
Appointment of Counsel-Criminal Procedure-Habeas Corpus
After relator's conviction for armed robbery in 1976, he indicated his intent
to appeal. He received his copy of the trial transcript in two portions. For
reasons not made known to the court, no appeal was taken after the transcript
was received. In 1982, relator's counsel filed an application for a writ of habeas
corpus in the Circuit Court of Marion County. The court denied the relator's
request for discharge from confinement because there was found no "extraor-
dinary dereliction" on the part of the State in providing him with an opportunity
to appeal. On appeal, the court addressed whether this denial was proper.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals decided a defendant can not
be discharged from confinement on the ground that he has been denied a right
to a meaningful appeal where any dereliction on the part of the State to appoint
counsel was corrected. The court pointed out that while the State is constitu-
tionally obliged to appoint effective counsel to assist an indigent criminal defend-
ant in his appeal, once this has been done there rests on the indigent criminal
defendant some responsibility to make known to the court his counsel's inaction.
RANDOLPH v. CIRCUIT COURT OFDODDRIDGE COUNTY, No. 17097, slip
op. (W. Va. Apr. 4, 1986).
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Petitioner was convicted of receiving and transferring stolen property. After
the sentencing, petitioner indicated his intent to appeal. Because the trial tran-
script received by petitioner's counsel was not paid for, the trial court revoked
petitioner's appeal bond, thus depriving him of an opportunity to appeal.
In its consideration of whether an indigent criminal defendant who is denied
the opportunity to appeal is legally entitled to relief, the court decided that an
indigent criminal defendant does indeed have the right to appeal his conviction.
He also has the right to receive a copy of his trial transcript without cost to
him.
SELLERS v. BROADWATER, 342 S.E.2d 198 (W. Va. 1986).
Criminal Procedure-Plea Bargaining-Prohibition
According to a plea bargaining agreement, the petitioner agreed to plead
guilty to all counts of sexual abuse in exchange for probation. After he had
partially fulfilled the conditions of his probation, the mother of the victims
requested that the plea bargain agreement be set aside and a new trial initiated.
The trial judge complied with her request. A writ of prohibition was then filed
by the petitioner.
The issue considered by the court was whether, after a plea bargain agree-
ment has been reached in a criminal case and the defendant has partially per-
formed the conditions of his bargained-for sentence, a court may vacate the
order accepting the plea bargain.
The court held that in criminal cases in which the defendant has already
partially satisfied the conditions of his bargained-for sentence, an order affecting
that sentence is limited to cases in which the sentence is reduced. Attempts to
increase the penalty violate principles of double jeopardy.
STATE v. ADKINS, 346 S.E.2d 762 (W. Va. 1986).
Criminal Procedure-Search and Seizure
Upon receiving a "tip" from an unidentified party, police presented a sworn
affidavit and complaint for a search warrant to a magistrate. They then searched
the home of appellant's girlfriend for controlled substances. Appellant was sub-
sequently convicted of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance.
The court considered the following issues: (1) Whether the determination
of probable cause for issuance of a search warrant must be based solely on
facts contained within the four comers of the affidavit, and (2) whether a
defendant who is more than a casual visitor to an apartment or dwelling in
which illegal drugs have been seized has a right to challenge the search and
seizure of the illegal drugs which he is accused of possessing.
The court held that the determination of probable cause for issuance of a
search warrant must be based solely on facts contained within the four corners
19871
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of the affidavit. Thus, facts revealed later, such as the reliability of sources,
may not be alleged in subsequent proceedings. The court, while noting the good
faith reliance exception acknowledged in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897
(1984), did not find it applicable in a "bare bones" affidavit situation. The
court also held that a defendant who is more than a casual visitor to an apart-
ment or dwelling in which illegal drugs have been seized has the right to challenge
the search and seizure of the illegal drugs which he is accused of possessing.
Justice Neely dissented as to the necessity to rely solely on the facts con-
tained in the affidavit in order to determine probable cause for the issuance of
the search warrant.
STATE v. BALL, 337 S.E.2d 310 (W. Va. 1985).
Criminal Procedure-Juvenile Offender
Before pleading guilty to multiple homicides, the appellant entered into a
plea agreement whereby he was to plead guilty to the homicides he committed
as a juvenile in exchange for a sentence which would allow for his disposition
at the Anthony Center for Youthful Male Offenders instead of the State Pen-
itentiary. At the sentencing hearing, however, the trial court felt that it did not
have the authority to allow a defendant who had been sentenced to life im-
prisonment to be placed in a home for youthful offenders and sentenced him
to the West Virginia State Penitentiary. Appellant instituted an appeal claiming
that the court failed to follow the plea agreement.
On appeal, the court addressed the issue of whether a juvenile sentenced
to life imprisonment may nonetheless serve a portion of his sentence at an in-
stitution other than a penitentiary.
The court stated that "It]he entire tenor of section 49-5-13 of the West
Virginia Code is to provide substantial flexibility for sentencing of persons who
committed offenses when they were juveniles" and therefore a juvenile sentenced
to life imprisonment may serve a portion of his sentence at an institution other
than a penitentiary. The court has the authority to sentence a person who com-
mits a homicide while a juvenile to the Anthony Center for Youthful Male
Offenders even though he is sentenced as an adult.
STATE v. BARKER, 346 S.E.2d 344 (W. Va. 1986).
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Appellant was convicted of grand larceny after a police officer discovered
stolen goods in his vehicle. The officer had examined the truck parts, which
were in plain sight, and realized that the serial numbers had been removed.
Appellant contends that his conviction should be reversed due to communica-
tions between the trial judge and the jury outside the presence of the appellant
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to fully instruct the jury on the essential elements of the offense charged.
The court considered the following issues: (1) Whether the trial judge erred
by giving a note to the jury directing it to "continue deliberating" without
having the appellant or his counsel present for such communication; (2) whether
assistance of counsel can be considered ineffective when counsel fails to move
to suppress evidence which was obtained through a legal search of appellant's
truck; (3) whether the trial judge erred by failing to properly instruct the jury
as to an essential element of the offense alleged.
The court held that: (1) The trial judge erred by communicating with the
jury outside the presence of the appellant or his counsel, but, because the re-
versal of appellant's conviction was made on other grounds, the harmlessness
of the error was not discussed; (2) assistance of counsel may not be considered
ineffective where counsel fails to move to suppress evidence obtained legally
from the appellant's vehicle; (3) the trial judge erred by omitting an essential element
from his instruction to the jury defining the alleged offense.
STATE v. BLACK, 338 S.E.2d 370 (W. Va. 1985).
Confessions-Exclusionary Rule-Penalty
Appellant and another individual allegedly robbed a motel and kidnapped
two of its employees. Before learning of the robbery, a police officer stopped
the vehicle which appellant was driving. After the appellant passed the field
sobriety test, he was permitted to leave. The police officer who administered
the test had noticed two metal boxes on the seat of the vehicle. The testimony
of the police officer concerning the two metal boxes was allowed at trial even
though evidence concerning the later illegal seizure of the boxes was suppressed.
Before the trial of this case, appellant approached the prosecutor and voluntarily
made several admissions to him. The appellant claimed that the introduction of
this extra-judicial statement at trial was error. Finally, appellant also claimed
that the sentence imposed on him was disproportionate to the crimes committed.
The court addressed the following issues: (1) Whether the exclusionary rule
applies to evidence about which the prosecution learns from an independent
source who has no connection with the illegal search and seizure; (2) whether
a confession by the defendant to a prosecutor without the presence of the
defendant's counsel is admissible where it appears that there was no inducement
or threat made by the prosecutor and the defendant was not in custody; (3)
whether a sentence which is within the statutory boundaries as punishment for
the crime is disproportionate to that crime when the sentencing court took other
proportionality factors into account in making its decision.
The court held that: (1) The exclusionary rule does not apply when the state
learns from an independent source about the evidence sought to be suppressed;
(2) a statement made to the prosecutor while the defendant was not in custody
1987]
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or involved in custodial interrogation and without inducement by the prosecutor
is admissible at trial; (3) after a court has followed the general pattern of de-
termination as to the proportionality of a defendant's sentence and decides upon
a sentence which is within the statutory boundaries created for the particular
crime, that sentence is not considered disproportionate.
STATE v. CABELL, 342 S.E.2d 240 (W. Va. 1986).
Criminal Procedure-Plea Bargaining
Appellant was charged with five felony offenses. According to a plea bargain
agreement, the appellant agreed to plead guilty to two counts if the prosecutor
would seek dismissal of the three remaining counts and would recommend a
thirty year sentence on the aggravated robbery charge. The circuit court, how-
ever, did not inform the appellant that he would have no right to withdraw his
guilty pleas if the court decided not to accept the prosecutor's sentencing rec-
ommendation. At the sentencing hearing, the court chose not to follow the
prosecutor's recommendation and instead imposed a harsher sentence, Appel-
lant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas was denied.
The supreme court considered whether a guilty plea obtained through a plea
bargaining agreement should stand when the defendant is not informed that he
would have no right to withdraw his plea in the event that the court chose not
to follow the prosecutor's sentencing recommendations.
In deciding the issue, the court emphasized that in complying with Rule
I I(e)(2) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure, a trial court has two
options to meet its mandatory requirements. It may initially advise the defendant
at the time the guilty plea is taken that if the court does not accept the rec-
ommended sentence, the defendant will have no right to withdraw the guilty
plea. As a second option, the trial court may conditionally accept the guilty
plea pending a presentence report without giving the cautionary warning required
by Rule 1 l(e)(2). However, if it determines at the sentencing hearing not to
follow the recommended sentence, it must give the defendant the right to with-
draw the guilty plea. Since neither option was followed, the defendant must be
permitted to withdraw his guilty plea.
STATE v. COMBS, 338 S.E.2d 365 (W. Va. 1985).
Criminal Procedure, Lineup-Evidence
Appellant allegedly robbed a convenience store. The owner of the conven-
ience store recognized the perpetrator and later identified him by his voice and
other physical characteristics at a lineup conducted at police headquarters. Dur-
ing portions of the State's cross-examination and closing argument, the appellant
contended that the prosecution used tactics which constituted misconduct. The
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of an instruction on aggravated robbery as aggravated robbery implies the use
of a gun.
The court faced the following issues on appeal: (1) Whether evidence of a
police lineup in which the defendant was the shortest participant and the witness
described the perpetrator as being short should be suppressed as being unduly
suggestive; (2) whether prosecutorial tactics constitute misconduct of a mag-
nitude warranting reversal when the prosecutor commented on the exculpatory
information given to the police concerning the alleged perpetrator's wherea-
bouts; (3) whether evidence is insufficient to support the giving of an instruction
on aggravated robbery when the defendant only gestured indicating the existence
of a gun in his coat.
The court held that the reliability of the lineup procedure far outweighed
its suggestiveness and that the prosecutor's comments on the exculpatory in-
formation given to the police concerning the alleged perpetrator's whereabouts
did not constitute misconduct of a magnitude warranting reversal. None of the
questions or comments of the prosecuting attorney implied the existence of a
legal duty to come forward and disclose exculpatory information prior to trial.
The court also found that the instruction on aggravated robbery was warranted
because a gesture indicating the existence of a gun is enough to prove a defend-
ant guilty of armed robbery.
STATE v. COX, 338 S.E.2d 227 (W. Va. 1985).
Criminal Procedure-Sexual Misconduct
The appellant was convicted of two counts of first degree sexual abuse in
a trial where the option of a sexual misconduct verdict, a lesser offense, was
not offered to the jury. This option was not given by the trial court because
evidence produced at trial proved the existence of force and threats, thus there
was no choice for the jury. This "forcible compulsion" was not an element of
sexual misconduct. It was, however, an element of the offenses of sexual abuse
and sexual assault.
On appeal, the court faced the question of whether, when evidence proves
the existence of threats made by the defendant, it is error for a trial court to
refuse to allow the jury to consider the crime of sexual misconduct when the
element of "forcible compulsion" is not present in the definition of sexual
misconduct.
The court held that where there is no evidentiary dispute or insufficiency
on the elements of the greater offense which are different from the elements
of the lesser included offense, then the defendant is not entitled to a lesser
included offense instruction. "Forcible compulsion" is an element of sexual
abuse and sexual assault, but not of the offense of sexual misconduct. Thus,
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STATE v. DAVIS, 345 S.E.2d 549 (W. Va. 1986).
Criminal Procedure-Evidence-Pretrial Identification-Search and Seizure
The appellant was convicted of aggravated robbery after he allegedly robbed
a convenience store. Due to the information of several witnesses, the police went
to appellant's home and searched without a warrant. They later received a war-
rant and searched the home a second time. The appellant contended that the
admission at trial of clothing seized at the second search was improper. Ap-
pellant, in addition to several other assignments of error, contended that in-
court identification by a witness who had participated in an allegedly uncon-
stitutional photographic lineup was improper. Although the appellant was not
identified when he was first presented to witnesses at a physical lineup, he was
identified when he was depicted in a photo in which he was wearing military
attire. This clothing was similar to that of the perpetrator.
The supreme court considered the following issues: (1) Whether, after an
initial warrantless, illegal search, evidence obtained in a legal second search is
admissible when the information in the affidavit requesting the second search
has no connection with the original warrantless search; and (2) whether ad-
mission into evidence of an in-court identification by a witness who had no
reliable basis for the identification other than a pretrial photographic identi-
fication which created a substantial likelihood of misidentification was proper.
The court concluded that evidence obtained in a legal second search is ad-
missible when the information in the affidavit requesting the warrant for the
second search has no connection with the information obtained through a pre-
vious illegal search. The court also held that allowance of an in-court identi-
fication by a witness who had no reliable basis for such identification other
than a pretrial photographic identification procedure was improper due to the
substantial likelihood of misidentification created by that pretrial photographic
procedure.
STATE v. ELLIS, 342 S.E.2d 285 (W. Va. 1986).
Criminal Procedure-Evidence-Extrajudicial Statement
The appellant was charged with the shotgun wounding of his sister. Ap-
pellant's counsel filed a motion asking for copies of any statements made by
the appellant to any other person involved in the case, but the prosecution failed
to furnish such information. The prosecution, however, did produce such evi-
dence at trial which helped lead to a conviction of the appellant.
On appeal, the court addressed the issue of whether it is error to allow the
State to introduce prejudicial evidence of any inculpatory extrajudicial state-
ment allegedly made by appellant when that statement had not been disclosed
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The court held nondisclosure is prejudicial where the defense is suprised on
a material issue and where the failure to make the disclosure hampers the prep-
aration and presentation of the defendant's case. The testimony went to the
credibility of the appellant and was prejudicial.
STATE v. GRAVELY, 342 S.E.2d 186 (W. Va. 1986).
Criminal Law-Criminal Procedure-Evidence
Appellant was convicted of aggravated robbery and sentenced to fifteen
years in the penitentiary, but conviction was reversed due to the trial court's
admission of testimony regarding identification of the appellant obtained in
violation of his right to counsel. At retrial, the appellant, when informed by
the court that he had no legal right to both represent himself, and at the same
time have court appointed counsel assist him, stated he wanted to represent
himself and was again convicted and sentenced as above. Appellant was denied
his writ of habeas corpus alleging that he did not knowingly waive his right to
counsel, and that he was denied his right to appeal.
On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals addressed the fol-
lowing issues: (1) Whether the court erred in admitting testimony relating to
the pretrial identification of the appellant; and (2) whether the court erred in
finding that appellant waived his right to counsel with full knowledge and com-
prehension of that right and of the dangers in relinquishing it.
The supreme court held that the admission of the testimony of the robbery
victim, which related to the pretrial identification of the appellant in the base-
ment of the courthouse after the appellant had left the magistrate's office where
he expressed a desire to be represented by counsel, was merely cumulative of
other evidence before the jury and was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Furthermore, there was no error in the trial court's finding that the appellant
knowingly and intelligently elected to proceed without counsel. In this case,
failure to warn the appellant of the dangers of self-representation is not re-
versible error where the record indicates appellant's familiarity with the court
system and awareness of the consequences of his decision.
STATE v. HARLOW, 346 S.E.2d 350 (W. Va. 1986).
Criminal Procedure-Habeas Corpus-Plea Bargaining
According to a plea bargain agreement, relator was to plead guilty to one
count of attempted delivery of a controlled substance and plead nolo contendere
to two counts of petit larceny by information. In exchange for his plea, the
State was to make a nonbinding recommendation for probation and move to
dismiss one count of delivering the controlled substance. In the probation report,
the prosecutor made remarks concerning the relator's lack of cooperation. This,
the relator contended, constituted a breach of the prosecutor's agreement ac-
1987]
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cording to the bargain and thus the relator moved to withdraw his pleas. His
motion was denied. --
The supreme court considered whether the prosecutor's statement to the
probation officer concerning relator's lack of cooperation constituted a fair and
just reason for withdrawal of one's guilty pleas when the prosecutor had pre-
viously agreed to recommend probation.
The court held that negative statements made by a prosecutor who had
agreed to recommend probation constitutes a fair and just reason to withdraw
the defendant's guilty pleas. Such withdrawal would not unduly prejudice the
State.
STATE V. HUTCHINSON, 342 S.E.2d 138 (W. Va. 1986).
Criminal Procedure-Evidence-Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Appellant was allegedly involved in a gas station robbery. After receiving
his Miranda warnings at the police station, the appellant indicated his desire to
have a lawyer present. A voice sample was then taken without the attorney
present. Appellant was later convicted of nonaggravated robbery. He contended
that the pretrial voice identification should have been suppressed because the
police asked him to give the voice sample after he had requested to speak with
an attorney. He also contended that the lawyer's failure to object to the judge's
unconstitutional alibi instruction constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals considered the following is-
sues: (1) Whether the pretrial voice identification should have been suppressed
because the police asked the appellant to give it after he had requested the
presence of an attorney; and (2) whether a lawyer's failure to object to an
unconstitutional alibi instruction constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel when
such instruction hvd previously been considered applicable.
The court held that after a defendant expresses a clear, unequivocal desire
to be afforded presence of counsel, he is to be dealt with as if he actually is
represented. The request to give a voice sample, however, does not implicate
the privilege against self-incrimination. Thus, evidence obtained through the use
of the voice sample does not have to be suppressed. The court also decided
that counsel exhibited the normal and customary degree of skill even though
he did not object to the instruction given by the court. The court noted that
"counsel is normally not expected to foresee future new developments in the
law or.. .to research parallel jurisdictions... [or] federal rules of evidence in prep-
aration for a state proceeding."
STATE v. JENKINS, 346 S.E.2d 802 (W. Va. 1986).
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The defendant was convicted of second degree sexual assault. On appeal,
the defendant alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, error by the trial judge
in preventing the defense counsel from conducting meaningful cross-examina-
tions, and error by the trial judge in interrupting the trial with allegedly pre-
dudicial remarks about defense counsel's performance.
Addressing these issues, the court found that in determining the effectiveness
of assistance of counsel, a court must measure counsel's performance by the
normal and customary degree of skill possessed by attorneys who are knowl-
edgable in the area of criminal law. The ineffective assistance of counsel must
be proved by the preponderance of the evidence. The court also determined that
a judge is not precluded from intervening into the trial process as long as his
intervention does not prejudice the case of the defendant.
STATE v. MATNEY, 346 S.E.2d 818 (W. Va. 1986).
Criminal Law-Criminal Procedure-Evidence-Juror Competency-Self-de-
fense
The Circuit Court of Mingo County had adjudged the defendant guilty of
second degree murder and sentenced him to an indeterminate term of five to
eighteen years imprisonment, for the killing of Ermel Lester in a tavern with
a .22 caliber revolver after Lester threatened the defendant by swinging a pipe
at him. The last two shots were fired after the victim was lying on the floor
of the tavern. There was a history of hostility between the two men, defendant
had told a third person he would kill the victim one day, and defendant ex-
pressed no remorse at the crime.
The court determined three issues in the case: (1) Whether it was reversible
error to instruct the jury on both first and second degree murder without a
showing of malice, when the evidence showed the defendant had acted in the
heat of passion under great provocation; (2) whether the evidence adduced at
trial was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did
not act in self-defense; (3) whether the State's dismissal of a juror for cause
was error, when the juror stated that he knew both the defendant and the victim
and that "it would be hard" to render a fair verdict.
The court determined that the evidence was such that the jury could have
found beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was not done in self-defense
as a matter of law. The defendant was not even struck by the weapon wielded
by the victim. It is not error to give instructions on murder of the first and
second degree if there is "any evidence tending, in any appreciable degree, to
prove such offense." Moreover, the action of a trial court in striking a juror
is largely discretionary. In any case where it is in doubt, the doubt must be
resolved in favor of the challenge. The juror's responses to questioning certainly
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STATE v. MILLER, 336 S.E.2d 910 (W. Va. 1985).
Criminal Procedure-Evidence-Kidnapping-Sexual Assault
The appellant allegedly asked two girls to help him locate his dog. After
he had made various stops, he drove one of the girls out to a wooded area and
sexually assaulted her. He was convicted of both kidnapping and first degree
sexual assault.
The conviction was appealed to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
on several assignments of error. On appeal, the court initially decided that it
was not a violation of double jeopardy principles for a defendant to be convicted
of both kidnapping and first degree sexual assault where the defendant exercised
control over the victim for a significant amount of time even before the assault.
Kidnapping is not merely incidental to sexual assault where the defendant ex-
ercised this type of control. In deciding whether the acts that technically con-
stitute kidnapping are incidental to another crime, courts should examine the
length of time the victim was held or moved, the distance the victim was forced
to move, the location and environment of the place the victim was detained,
and the exposure of the victim to an increased rate of harm. The court also
held that a victim is not a "voluntary social companion" of a defendant simply
because the victim voluntarily becomes a companion prior to the beginning of
an assault. In addition, the court stated that an indictment is sufficient when
it follows the language of the statute, enables the court to determine the statute
on which the charge is based, and fully informs the accused of the particular
offense with which he is charged. Furthermore, defendant and his counsel do
not have a right to be present at the grand jury proceedings from which the
defendant's indictment results. The court also noted that rulings on the ad-
missibility of evidence are within the trial court's discretion and are left un-
disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion and that it was not error for the
trial court to refuse to require the State to give the defendant a copy of police
reports where defendant's counsel made no motion requesting these reports.
STATE v. MINOR, 341 S.E.2d 838 (W. Va. 1986).
Criminal Procedure-Probation Revocation
The appellant, convicted of welfare fraud, was sentenced to imprisonment
in the county jail for a term of twelve months. After being placed on probation,
appellant's probation officer filed with the court a petition to revoke her pro-
bation on the ground that the appellant had failed to abide by certain of its
conditions. Specifically, the probation officer alleged that she had failed to make
any restitution payments. The court revoked her probation and ordered her to
serve the remainder of the sentence in the county jail. Appellant contends that
the state did not establish the violation by a clear preponderance of the evidence.
The issue confronting the court was whether, in a proceeding to revoke an
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burden of proof when it proves only that the individual failed to pay restitution.
The court held that the State must also prove that the failure to pay res-
titution was contumacious. The State in the present case did not meet that
burden.
STATE v. OXIER, 338 S.E.2d 360 (W. Va. 1985).
Criminal Procedure-Pretrial Silence
Appellant was convicted of breaking and entering. During the trial, he was
cross-examined about his pretrial silence on the issue of his alibi. The prosecutor
commented on the same during his closing argument. The prosecutor also mis-
stated the law in regard to his explanation of "reasonable doubt" to the jury.
Following his conviction, the appellant instituted his appeal.
The court addressed the following issues: (1) Whether a prosecutor may
cross-examine a defendant in regard to his pretrial silence or comment on the
same to the jury, and (2) whether a prosecutor's misstatement of the law in
closing argument, after the jury has already been correctly instructed, constitutes
reversible error when the accused is not prejudiced.
The court decided that a prosecutor may not cross-examine a defendant in
regard to his pretrial silence or comment on the same to the jury. Thus, the
prosecutor committed reversible error. The court also held that when the accused
is not prejudiced, misstatement by the prosecutor of a concept that has pre-
viously been correctly explained to the jury does not constitute reversible error.
STATE v. SANDLER, 336 S.E.2d 535 (W. Va. 1985).
Criminal Procedure-Evidence-Self-representation
Appellant was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. He sub-
mitted to a breath test which was not preserved by the police. At trial, he became
dissatisfied with his appointed counsel and requested new counsel. Because this
request was denied, appellant elected to proceed without counsel. After the jury
retired for deliberations they requested more evidence. The trial judge allowed
the reopening of the trial for the introduction of more evidence on the part of
the prosecution. The jury then found the appellant guilty. The defendant ap-
pealed the conviction on several assignments of error.
On appeal, the court held that court-appointed counsel may not be dismissed
absent a conflict of interest, a breakdown in attorney-client communication, or
some conflict which may lead to an unjust verdict. However, defendant is en-
titled to relief when he proceeds without counsel and is not properly warned
about the dangers of self-representation. The court also concluded that even
though due process does not require law enforcement agencies to preserve breath
samples obtained during the testing for alcohol consumption, introduction of
1987]
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additional evidence after the close of a case but before the jury returns a verdict
may be cause for reversal where the reopening was handled in a prejudicial
manner.
STATE v. SWIGER, 336 S.E.2d 541 (W. Va. 1985).
Criminal Procedure
Pretrial psychological examinations concluded that the appellant was men-
tally retarded and incompetent to stand trial. Approximately a year and a half
after the criminal incident, the appellant was diagnosed at a state medical facility
as having an improved mental condition with the competency to stand trial.
Subsequently, a doctor who previously examined the appellant concluded again
that the appellant was incompetent to stand trial. After a hearing the circuit
court found the appellant competent to stand trial. Appellant was convicted of
two felonies and sentenced to two concurrent penitentiary terms. He contended
that he was not guilty by reason of insanity and that he was not competent to
stand trial.
On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals addressed the fol-
lowing issues: (1) Whether appellant's counsel was ineffective in allegedly not
submitting evidence during the hearing of the appellant's incompetency to stand
trial; (2) whether the evidence submitted during the hearing established the ap-
pellant's incompetency to stand trial; (3) whether one found incompetent to
stand trial shall be periodically reviewed.
The court held that defense counsel at a competency hearing who does not
call witnesses who could have directly testified that the appellant was incom-
petent to stand trial is not ineffective in his assistance to his client where such
missing testimony would be only cumulative of testimony already given. The
lack of such testimony is harmless error because the circuit court committed
error in finding that the appellant was competent to stand trial. One who is
sane at the time of the acts cannot be tried when mentally incapacitated, and
one is only competent when exhibiting the ability to consult rationally and un-
derstandably with his counsel, while also factually understanding the proceedings
against him. Furthermore, the circuit court committed reversible error in finding
the appellant competent to stand trial on testimony less than certain, and where
other testimony arising from the results of two examinations maintained that
the appellant was incompetent to stand trial. This case was reversed and re-
manded for proceedings including a determination of whether appellant is com-
petent to stand trial, and if found incompetent, appellant's competency to stand
trial shall be periodically reviewed.
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Appellant was jointly indicted with four other individuals for the offense
of grand larceny. The same jury was permitted to hear the trials of the appellant
and the other joint indictees.
On appeal, the court addressed whether this procedure constituted reversible
error.
The court reversed and remanded the case on the grounds that the same
juror should not be permitted to hear the trials of two defendants who are
charged with the same offense but tried separately.
STATE v. WALLACE, 337 S.E.2d 321 (W. Va. 1985).
Criminal Procedure-Evidence
After the appellant allegedly robbed a supermarket, he left tracks in the
snow as he fled the area. The police, following the tracks, were able to locate
and arrest the appellant. The evidence at trial, which was primarily circum-
stantial, included the results of a comparison between hair taken from the ski
mask worn by the perpetrator and hair from the appellant. At the close of the
trial, the court instructed the jury as to the punishment for carrying a deadly
weapon without a license even though the prosecution did not directly prove
that the appellant did not have such a license. The defendant was convicted of
attempted aggravated robbery and unlawfully carrying a deadly weapon. The
defendant appealed his conviction on several grounds.
On appeal, the court held that a conviction should not be set aside on the
ground that the verdict is contrary to or not supported by the evidence when
circumstantial evidence is enough to convince impartial minds of the guilt of
the defendant. The court stated that hair samples may be admitted into evidence
when an expert witness is not absolutely certain that the hair came from the
defendant as long as the tests are scientifically reliable. However, the court did
find that it is improper to instruct a jury as to the punishment for carrying a
dangerous or deadly weapon without a license when the prosecution does not
directly prove that a defendant lacked a license. The absense of a license is an
element of the crime of carrying a dangerous or deadly weapon without a license,
and the burden of proof as to that element must be borne by the State.
STATE ex rel. DeVAUL v. FELTZ, No. 16771, slip op. (W. Va. Dec. 6, 1985).
Criminal Procedure-Notice of Appeal-Prohibition
After being convicted of trespassing by respondent, relator appealed to the
Circuit Court of Marion County. Although the prosecuting attorney sent relator
a letter informing him of the date and time of his appeal, the letter returned
unclaimed. Since the relator received no information concerning his appeal, he
was not present for the proceeding and his case was remanded.
1987]
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On appeal, the court addressed the issue of whether the Circuit Court of
Marion County followed the proper procedure for informing the relator of his
pending appeal.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that when a court fails
to inform an appellant of the date and time of his proceeding and the appellant
is therefore not in attendance, he must be given another opportunity to voice
his appeal.
STATE ex rel. EVERETT v. HAMILTON, 337 S.E.2d 312 (W. Va. 1985).
Criminal Procedure-Habeas Corpus
Petitioner, convicted of voluntary manslaughter, was sentenced to life im-
prisonment pursuant to the West Virginia Habitual Criminal Statute due to his
two prior felony convictions. One of these two prior felony convictions was
later reversed. His sentence was thereafter reduced at a hearing at which pe-
titioner was not present. He claimed that the imposition of the reduced sentence
without his presence was void.
The court considered whether, after a defendant's sentence had originally
been enhanced under the recidivist statute, his presence is required at a hearing
in which that enhanced sentence is modified.
The court held that a defendant's presence is not required when his sentence
is being reduced from its original form. Although a criminal defendant has the
right to be present at almost every stage of his trial, a resentencing is unrelated
to the underlying truth process. Therefore, his presence is not required.
STATE ex rel. LEVITT v. BORDENKIRCHER, 342 S.E.2d 127 (W. Va. 1986).
Criminal Procedure-Evidence-Felony Murder-Habeas Corpus-Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel
Petitioner allegedly shot a child while trying to rob her and her sister. He
gave a voluntary tape recorded confession to the police which provided sufficient
evidence to convict him of first degree murder under the felony-murder doctrine.
Petitioner's counsel did not move to suppress that confession. The issue before
the court was whether petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel.
The court held that where there are no grounds to support a motion to
suppress certain evidence, a defendant is not denied effective assistance of coun-
sel when that counsel fails to object to the inclusion of that evidence. Counsel's
performance is measured by the normal and customary degree of skill possessed
by lawyers in like practice. Questions involving strategy, tactics, and other ar-
guable courses of action will not be grounds for the claim of ineffective as-
sistance of counsel, unless no reasonably qualified defense attorney would have
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STATE ex rel. SUTTON v. KEADLE, 342 S.E.2d 103 (W. Va. 1985).
Criminal Procedure-Prohibition-Three-term Rule
The relator was initially indicted during the January 1984 term of the Circuit
Court of Upshur County on felony charges. The three regular annual terms of
that circuit court commence in January, April, and September. At the time of
the indictment, relator was serving a sentence for an unrelated offense in another
county. No effort was made to prosecute the relator during three regular terms
of court. Thus, the relator presented a motion to dismiss on the gounds that
the State had failed to prosecute him according to the guidelines of the three-
term rule, section 62-3-21 of the West Virginia Code. Following denial of his
motion by the court, the relator sought a writ of prohibition to prevent his trial
on the two count felony indictment.
The court was faced with the question of whether a defendant, incarcerated
under a sentence in one county while there are criminal charges pending in
another county, is entitled to relief under the provisions of the three-term rule
when the prosecutor in the county where the charges are pending does not secure
the defendant's return for trial in accordance with the provisions of that rule.
The court found it apparent from the language of the three-term statute
that it "begins to run at the term subsequent to the term that the indictment
or presentment is returned into a court of competent jurisdiction." This fact
is independent of the defendant's physical location. Therefore, the court decided
that a defendant was entitled to relief under the circumstances but added that
if, however, the defendant was awaiting trial in another county instead of simply
being incarcerated there under a separate sentence, the three-term rule would
not apply in the county in which other criminal charges are pending.
VANMETRE v. SA VASTEN, No. 17117, slip op. (W. Va. July 9, 1986).
Criminal Procedure-Prohibition-Three-term Rule
The relator was indicted for burglary in the September 1983 term of the
Circuit Court of Morgan County. At the time of his indictment, relator was
incarcerated in a jail in Maryland. He remained in Maryland until being de-
livered to Grant County, West Virginia, to await sentencing on a separate charge
of grand larceny. He remained in the Grant County jail until he was sentenced
in October 1984 on the grand larceny charge after which he was incarcerated
at the Huttonsville Correctional Center. The three regular annual terms of the
Circuit Court of Morgan County begin in January, April, and September. In
November, 1985, the relator filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the
State had failed to prosecute him on his burglary charge within three terms of
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The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals found that the three-term rule
is applicable when a defendant is incarcerated awaiting sentence on a separate
charge and granted the requested writ of prohibition.
The court noted that once a defendant's whereabouts is known to a pros-
ecutor, that prosecutor is under a duty to exercise reasonable diligence to obtain
custody for the purpose of offering him a speedy trial.
WHI7T v. HOLLAND, 342 S.E.2d 292 (W. Va. 1986).
Criminal Procedure-Habeas Corpus-Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus due to the alleged ineffective
assistance of his counsel at the appellate level. Petitioner contended that he was
denied a right to assist his counsel in the preparation of his appeal.
The issue faced by the court involved whether the assistance of counsel
should be considered ineffective when cousel failed to communicate with the
petitioner during the appeal and presented an inadequate appeal petition.
The court concluded that the standard for judging the effectiveness of coun-
sel's assistance involves the question of whether counsel exhibited the normal
and customary degree of skill possessed by attorneys engaged in such practice.
Petitioner was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal.
WORLEY v. HENDRICK, No. 17118, slip op. (W. Va. July 11, 1986).
Criminal Procedure-Habeas Corpus-Trial Transcript
Petitioner, convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life impris-
onment, requested a copy of his original trial transcript on June 9, 1984. By
March 13, 1986, petitioner had not received his transcript. He thereafter filed
a writ of habeas corpus seeking discharge on the basis of extraordinary der-
eliction. The transcript was not filed until May 21, 1986.
The appellate court considered the question of whether a prisoner is entitled
to discharge from confinement due to the State's extraordinary dereliction in
failing to provide a trial transcript.
The court determined that the State was not extraordinarily derelict in pro-
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State v. Fitcher, 337 S.E.2d 918 (W. Va. 1985).
State v. Taylor, 337 S.E.2d 923 (W. Va. 1985).
State v. Wallace, 337 S.E.2d 321 (W. Va. 1985).
State v. William T., 338 S.E.2d 215 (W. Va. 1985).
EVIDENCE:
State v. Acord, 336 S.E.2d 741 (W. Va. 1985).
State v. Berry, 342 S.E.2d 259 (W. Va. 1986).
State v. Dolin, 347 S.E.2d 208 (W. Va. 1986).
State v. Hager, 342 S.E.2d 281 (W. Va. 1986).
State v. Hatala, 345 S.E.2d 310 (W. Va. 1986).
State v. Sexton, 346 S.E.2d 745 (W. Va. 1985).
State v. Simmons, 337 S.E.2d 314 (W. Va. 1985).
State v. Thompson, 342 S.E.2d 268 (W. Va. 1986).
State v. York, 338 S.E.2d 219 (W. Va. 1985).
In re Vance, 337 S.E.2d 916 (W. Va. 1985).
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